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**MEMORANDUM FOR: General Cutler
The White House**

**SUBJECT : Permanent Procedure for Net Capabilities
Evaluation Subcommittee**

1. This is in reply to your letter of 21 December requesting my comments on paragraphs 2 and 3 of the proposed directive for future evaluations of net capabilities of the USSR to damage the United States and its overseas installations.

2. I have no comment on paragraph 2 of the draft.

3. Paragraph 3, I believe, needs clarification and simplification in the description of the three types of attack. I suggest the following substitutions for a, b and c thereof:

a. The maximum attack assuming no strategic warning.

b. The most probable attack with the estimated amount of warning time most likely under the circumstances of that attack.

c. A sneak attack designed for the maximum surprise attainable and with the amount of warning time estimated as most likely under the circumstances.

4. I feel that it is my duty also to comment on the organization proposed in paragraph 5 from the viewpoint of effectiveness and security. The subcommittee as constituted in the draft directive, it seems to me, is needlessly cumbersome, indicates a disproportionate emphasis on certain elements of the problem, and gives agencies which do not have responsibility therefor the mission of making over-all military and foreign intelligence judgments.

5. It is my conviction that the general procedures followed this past year under NSC 5423 provide the most effective and at the same

time the most secure method of achieving the results desired. If any of the other agencies, referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft, consider that under some adjustment of these procedures they could make a more effective contribution, I feel sure that this could and would be worked out by the Chairman of the Subcommittee, particularly if there is adequate time afforded to prepare the estimate, which was not the case last year.

6. An overriding consideration in this exercise is the need for protecting the security of the most sensitive operational, technical, and intelligence secrets of the government. Here a most rigorous "need-to-know" test should be applied. The composition of the subcommittee and its staff and the procedures contemplated will require the disclosure of highly sensitive operational and intelligence information to fairly large numbers of individuals throughout many agencies which are concerned only with particular phases of the evaluation.

7. I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss this problem with the President, Admiral Radford and you before final action is taken on the proposed directive.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

cc: Admiral Radford

General Robert Cutler
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bobby:

By memorandum of 21 December you requested my comments on certain paragraphs of a proposed Presidential Directive establishing a permanent procedure for net capabilities evaluations and asked that these be in your hands by 15 January.

I have been considering this matter with care and do have rather definite reservations as to the machinery proposed. Before submitting them, however, I would like an opportunity to talk to Admiral Radford and have been hoping to do so this week in order to meet your deadline. However, in view of Radia's illness we may not be able to get together before Saturday; so I would very much appreciate it if you would hold up issuance of the Directive until you hear further from me.

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

ODDI:RAMORY, Jr.:jm
(Dictated but not read)
(12 January 1955)

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